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Abstract 
We ask how employers contribute to unemployment scarring in the recruitment process in the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland. By drawing on recruitment theories, we aim to better understand how recruiters assess differ-
ent patterns of unemployment in a job candidate’s CV and how this affects the chances of young applicants being 
considered for a vacancy. We argue that in contexts with tight school-work linkage and highly standardised Vocational 
Education and Training systems, the detrimental effect of early unemployment depends on how well the applicant’s 
profile matches the requirements of the advertised position. To test this assumption, we surveyed Swiss recruiters 
who were seeking to fill positions during the time of data collection. We employed a factorial survey experiment that 
tested how the (un)employment trajectories in hypothetical young job applicants’ CV affected their chances of being 
considered for a real vacancy. Our results show that unemployment decreases the perceived suitability of an applicant 
for a specific job, which implies there is a scarring effect of unemployment that increases with the duration of being 
unemployed. But we also found that these effects are moderated by how well the applicant’s profile matches the 
job’s requirements. Overall, the worse the match between applicant’s profile and the job profile, the smaller are the 
scarring effects of unemployment. In sum, our findings contribute to the literature by revealing considerable hetero-
geneity in the scarring effects of unemployment. Our findings further suggest that the scarring effects of unemploy-
ment need to be studied with regard to country-specific institutional settings, the applicants’ previous education and 
employment experiences, and the job characteristics.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, a broad body of literature has shed light 
on how unemployment affects (re-)integration in the 
labour market and has investigated under what condi-
tions the so-called scarring effects of unemployment may 
occur. The effects of unemployment on later employment 
chances vary from country to country and occupation to 
occupation (Grip and Wolbers 2006). They depend on 
factors such as cyclical changes in the overall economic 
condition and institutional school-work linkage (Breen 
2005; Gangl 2002; Müller and Gangl 2003; Wolbers 
2007). With regard to youth unemployment, it is impor-
tant to ask in what contexts unemployment matters for 
individuals’ later labour-market outcomes. Demand-
side studies have focused on recruiters’ perceptions of 
unemployment and how this can influence their hiring 
decisions. Applicants’ features, such as the duration of 
unemployment (Kroft et al. 2013; Oberholzer-Gee 2008), 
and characteristics of the vacancy, such as the skill level 
of the job (Bonoli 2014), have both been shown to have 
determinant influences on hiring outcomes.
Country-specific classifications of education sys-
tems and labour markets are often too crude to capture 
recruiting dynamics that vary greatly across different 
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types and levels of jobs within countries. Depending 
on their type and level, different occupations are con-
nected to different educational tracks. The tightness of 
the school-work linkage varies accordingly, which in 
turn leads to varying recruitment strategies. In this arti-
cle, we focus on the regional labour-market context of 
German-speaking Switzerland, which is characterised, 
like Germany, by a high degree of vocational specificity 
and standardisation in the school-to-work transition sys-
tem (Imdorf et al. 2017; Shavit and Müller 1998; Müller 
and Gangl 2003; Stalder and Nägele 2011). Compared to 
other OECD countries, the youth unemployment rate is 
relatively low in Switzerland, and it was also at a compa-
rably low level after the recent Great Recession. In the 
fourth quarter of 2015, 9.8% of young people between 
15 and 24 were unemployed (OECD 2015; according 
to the ILO definition of unemployment). The propor-
tion of skilled young workers at the entry level who have 
been unemployed long-term  (0.1% in September 2012) 
is lower than that of skilled older workers (0.4% in Sep-
tember 2012) (Sacchi 2012: 9). This picture has remained 
stable since 2004, showing a low share of young workers 
remaining unemployed over 1  year (ibid.). We are thus 
analysing the contextual significance of unemployment 
scarring in a country with a stable economy and relatively 
low unemployment figures compared to many European 
countries.
To understand the consequences of early unemploy-
ment, we draw on signalling theory (McCormick 1990; 
Spence 1973) and human capital theory (Becker 1964; 
Pissarides 1992). We argue that in contexts with a struc-
tural school-to-work transition such as in Switzerland, 
the detrimental effect of early unemployment depends 
on how well the applicant’s profile matches the require-
ments of the advertised position. By conducting a facto-
rial survey experiment, we have aimed to overcome the 
challenge, addressed in recent recruitment studies, of 
simultaneously taking recruiters’ and applicants’ charac-
teristics into account. Our methodological design ena-
bles us to account for applicants’ characteristics and the 
recruiters’ side by controlling for the match between the 
applicants’ profiles and the job requirements. The facto-
rial experiment is built upon hypothetical applications 
tailored to real-world job vacancies, which are evaluated 
by the recruiters in charge of filling the selected vacant 
positions. This unique experimental design helps maxim-
ise external and internal validity.
In the following, we first discuss the findings of pre-
vious recruitment studies on the scarring effects of 
unemployment (Sect. 2). In Sect. 3, we present the theo-
retical framework of our study, from which we derive our 
hypotheses. Section  4 describes the data and methods 
applied. The results are presented in Sect. 5, followed by 
their discussion in Sect.  6. A conclusion is given at the 
end.
2  Unemployment scarring in previous recruitment 
studies
Studies on recruitment have been attempting to exam-
ine the impact of unemployment on future labour-mar-
ket outcomes. Different studies have investigated the 
link between the duration of unemployment and later 
employment outcomes. This association is referred to 
as duration dependence in the labour-market literature 
(Eriksson and Rooth 2014; Luijkx and Wolbers 2009; 
Oberholzer-Gee 2008; Kroft et  al. 2013; van den Berg 
and van Ours 1996, 1999). While the majority of stud-
ies have found evidence for a negative duration depend-
ence (Abbring et  al. 2001; van den Berg and van Ours 
1996, 1999; Kroft et al. 2013; Luijkx and Wolbers 2009), 
the results of other studies do not support an associa-
tion between the duration of unemployment and future 
employment outcomes (Farber et al. 2015; Nunley et al. 
2017). Yet other studies have found duration dependence 
for some groups but not for others, suggesting a high 
degree of heterogeneity in how unemployment relates to 
future career trajectories (Eriksson and Rooth 2014).
Oberholzer-Gee (2008) tested the impact of differ-
ent lengths of unemployment, from 6  months up to 
30  months, on future employment chances by sending 
fictitious CV to recruiters in Switzerland and measur-
ing the callback rate. The author found evidence that 
employers recruiting administrative assistants in Swit-
zerland prefer the short-term unemployed (6 months) to 
currently employed applicants. Kroft et al. (2013) found 
the same effect in a correspondence-testing study that 
was carried out in a hundred cities in the United States 
with different labour-market tightness. The results of 
both studies suggest that employers prefer the currently 
unemployed because they can start working immediately. 
Nevertheless, the callback rate eventually decreases when 
the duration of unemployment exceeds a certain length 
(8 months in the US study and 2 years in the Swiss study). 
Van den Berg and van Ours (1996, 1999) investigated 
how the impact of unemployment on later career chances 
varies between groups of people with different socio-
economic backgrounds by using national data provided 
by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and French public 
employment offices. The authors found evidence that the 
duration dependence varies for different ethnic groups 
(1999) and between women and men (1996).
In contrast to the above studies, Farber et  al. (2015) 
could not find support for duration dependence in their 
audit study carried out across eight US cities in 2012 and 
2014 with fictitious CV showing different durations of 
unemployment. Collecting data in different geographical 
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areas and at different times made it possible to account 
for varying unemployment rates. But no significant cor-
relation between the duration of unemployment and 
callback rate could be found across cities with differing 
labour markets. Similarly, in a recent correspondence 
study carried out by Nunley et al. (2017) in seven large US 
cities, the authors did not find any significant differences 
between the callback rates for fictitious CV showing 3, 
6, or 12 months of unemployment, independent of geo-
graphical location. And a Swedish study carried out by 
Eriksson and Rooth (2014) showed that duration depend-
ence can vary between different job segments. Whereas a 
current period of unemployment of at least 9 months has 
a negative impact on callback rates in medium- and low-
skill jobs, they did not find any negative duration depend-
ence for high-skill jobs. The differences in the findings 
and the difficulty in determining whether and how the 
duration of unemployment impacts future labour-market 
outcomes suggests that context matters and moderates 
the consequences of unemployment.
Various studies have identified many factors that affect 
the employment chances of applicants who have expe-
rienced unemployment. They range from educational 
background and work experience to the duration of 
unemployment and the job requirements. But previous 
studies have neglected how the effect of unemployment 
varies as a function of the match between the appli-
cant’s characteristics and the job requirements depend-
ing on the institutional setting. Although there is a large 
body of recruitment studies both on (mis-)match and 
on unemployment, to our knowledge there are only two 
recruiter-side studies that compare both effects (Baert 
and Verhaest 2014; Nunley et  al. 2017). Both studies 
apply correspondence testing to investigate the conse-
quences of previous job mismatch and unemployment 
on subsequent employment careers. They reconstruct 
previous job mismatch with fictitious CV that present 
work experience that is at a lower level than the appli-
cant’s earlier qualifications obtained through education. 
Such an approach makes it possible to test recruiters’ 
evaluations of CV with a poor correspondence between 
the type of education and previous job experience. But 
it does not provide insights into the consequences of a 
mismatch between the requirements of a vacant posi-
tion and the educational background and job experi-
ence of the applicants. Furthermore, this approach does 
not help elucidate how the effects of unemployment are 
moderated by a mismatch between the applicant’s pro-
file and the job requirements. We will thus contribute to 
the debate on mismatch and unemployment in two ways: 
first, by showing how unemployment scarring is moder-
ated by a (mis-)match between the applicant’s profile and 
the job requirements. Second, by differentiating between 
mismatch in occupation specificity and mismatch in edu-
cational level, which we address as horizontal and verti-
cal mismatch, respectively.
3  Theoretical framework and hypotheses
We draw on human capital theory and signalling theory 
to derive our hypotheses. Both theoretical approaches 
have been extensively used to study the scarring effects 
of unemployment on hiring chances (Arulampalam et al. 
2000; Lockwood 1991; Omori 1997). From the perspec-
tive of human capital theory, skill and knowledge are 
accumulated during time spent in education or at work 
(Becker 1964; Pissarides 1992). The time invested in edu-
cation and work experience can therefore be seen as an 
indicator of the productivity of an applicant. This implies 
that times of inactivity can be seen as missed opportu-
nities to gain human capital. Also, previously acquired 
skills can be lost if they are not practiced and updated 
through working (Blanchard and Summers 1986; Phelps 
1970; Pissarides 1992). Longer durations of unemploy-
ment therefore lead to greater depreciations in expected 
potential human capital.
Signalling theory starts from the premise that hiring is 
a situation of imperfect information since recruiters can-
not observe the productivity of applicants at the time of 
the hiring decision. Because it would be difficult, time-
consuming, and costly to directly assess applicants’ pro-
ductivity, recruiters draw on visible cues, the so-called 
signals (Spence 1973), to derive an estimate of produc-
tivity. Applicant features such as education credentials, 
school grades, and previous job titles serve as signals for 
the applicants’ unknown productivity and trainability (Di 
Stasio 2014). In addition, we may assume that an appli-
cant’s productivity also depends on the quality of the 
job-worker match (see Oyer and Schaefer 2011: 1786–
87), suggesting that signals will also be used to evaluate 
how well the applicant’s profile meets the job require-
ments. Furthermore, information can also be drawn from 
more implicit cues such as gaps in the CV or frequent 
job changes, and it has been argued that unemployment 
can have a negative impact on the chances of finding a 
job and on future wages (Arulampalam et al. 2000, 2001; 
Schmieder et  al. 2016). Studies investigating the signal-
ling value of unemployment have found that employers 
might associate unemployment with low motivation, low 
productivity, and undesirable personality traits (Atkin-
son et  al. 1996; Bonoli 2014), resulting in a higher risk 
of workplace disruption (Devins and Hogarth 2005). As 
a consequence, unemployment can lead to lower rates of 
being able to find a job (Eriksson and Lagerström 2006).
Similar to human capital assumptions, the signalling 
value of unemployment can differ with the length of 
unemployment: longer periods of unemployment may 
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have a stronger negative signal value than shorter peri-
ods. Some studies suggest that depending on the eco-
nomic context and occupational field, short current 
unemployment does not necessarily decrease the chances 
of being hired (Oberholzer-Gee 2008). The signal of 
unemployment must thus be understood within spe-
cific contexts. The characteristics of the applicants, the 
features of the advertised jobs, and the country-specific 
institutional context must be accounted for.
In sum, we argue that the chance of being considered 
for a job is negatively associated with the presence and 
duration of unemployment. All else being equal, recruit-
ers will evaluate applicants with long periods of unem-
ployment less favourably than those with short 
unemployment or without any unemployment (hypothesis 
H1). Switzerland seems especially suitable for analysing 
the signalling value of unemployment since it has a 
strong1 and strongly standardised VET system with high 
specificity. This fosters a relatively smooth transition into 
the labour market because employers trust VET creden-
tials, which facilitates the entrance of VET holders into 
the labour market (Breen 2005). The tight school-work 
linkage and low youth unemployment rate suggest that 
the negative signalling value of unemployment should be 
more pronounced (Biewen and Steffes 2010) and increase 
with growing  duration of unemployment. If unemploy-
ment occurs, the corresponding gaps on a CV will draw 
recruiters’ attention and be evaluated cautiously.
Depending on the specific qualifications offered by dif-
ferent academic and vocational-training programmes, 
different skills and knowledge—and hence different types 
of human capital—are acquired during education. The 
signalling value of credentials therefore varies substan-
tially across different types of education within a country 
(Allmendinger 1989). In comparison to the more generic 
signals of general-education certificates, VET education 
primarily aims to prepare learners for the labour mar-
ket by providing them above all with occupation-specific 
skills, and VET certificates provide standardised informa-
tion about job applicants’ skills. Hence, for jobs requiring 
specialised skills, the completion of a suitable VET cer-
tificate is a crucial signal for the perceived productivity of 
a job candidate.
However, in addition to occupational credentials, ade-
quate work experience may also matter. Despite the tight 
education-employment linkage in the occupationally 
segmented Swiss labour market, VET certificates do not 
necessarily guarantee a smooth transition from school to 
1 About two thirds of lower secondary-school graduates entered VET edu-
cation in 2013, and about one third enrolled in general education. These 
proportions have continued to remain constant over recent years (Schellen-
bauer et al. 2010).
work anymore due to increasingly complex work realities 
and requirements (Salvisberg and Sacchi 2014). As a con-
sequence, employment experiences and further training 
in the field are often required and gain in importance as 
sorting criteria in hiring for qualified jobs. Considering 
the competition between VET-degree holders for skilled 
jobs, it can be argued that an occupation-specific degree 
is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for hiring. We 
assume that in a country with VET predominant in upper 
secondary education, both occupation-specific educa-
tion and occupation-specific job experience are the most 
fundamental requirements in order to be considered for a 
position. In such a context, we expect recruiters to largely 
ignore applicants who do not meet these basic require-
ments. As a consequence, if an application is more or less 
ineligible due to education and job experience, there will 
hardly be any leeway left for a negative scarring effect 
from unemployment. Hence, the chance of being consid-
ered for a job is negatively associated with the presence of 
periods of unemployment only to the degree that appli-
cants’ profiles meet the fundamental job requirements 
(hypothesis H2).
(Mis-)matches between applicants’ profiles and job 
requirements can be measured along the horizontal and 
the vertical axes. A horizontal match is when the appli-
cant has occupation-specific education and work expe-
rience. A vertical match is when the applicant has the 
required level of both education and work experience. As 
we have argued, the Swiss labour market is strongly occu-
pationally segmented, which means that recruiters attach 
great importance to applicants’ occupation-specific edu-
cation and work experience. This leads to the assump-
tion that the horizontal match particularly moderates the 
scarring effect of unemployment.
Hence, refining the second hypothesis H2, we assume 
that the chance of being considered for a job is negatively 
associated with the presence of periods of unemployment 
specifically when the applicant has an occupation-specific 
educational background and work experience (hypothesis 
H3).
4  Data and methods
4.1  Research design
Our data was obtained in the context of the NEGOTI-
ATE project2 by conducting a multinational online 
recruiter survey across five occupational fields—mechan-
ics, finance, nursing, gastronomy, and information tech-
nology—and four European countries—Bulgaria, Greece, 
2 NEGOTIATE is a Horizon 2020 project involving ten participating coun-
tries (https ://negot iate-resea rch.eu/).
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Norway, and Switzerland (https ://negot iate-resea rch.
eu/). Within this survey, we embedded a factorial survey 
experiment and a choice task (Hyggen et  al. 2016). The 
present article draws on the Swiss experimental data of 
this study based on a factorial survey experiment (FSE). 
This multidimensional experimental design, which 
implements vignettes representing hypothetical objects 
or situations (job applicants’ CV in our case; see Auspurg 
and Hinz 2015; Jasso 2006; Rossi and Anderson 1982), 
has been applied in labour-market research investigating 
behaviours in searching for and accepting jobs (Abraham 
et al. 2013; Auspurg and Gundert 2015) or evaluating the 
wage models of organisations (Weibel et  al. 2010). In 
recruitment research, however, FSE has only recently 
gained attention (Di Stasio 2014; Di Stasio and Gërxhani 
2015; Humburg and van der Velden 2015). Conjoint or 
audit studies are more popular forms for field experi-
ments on recruitment. In such studies, respondents are 
not aware they are participating in a study, and the effect 
of the experimental variable(s) are usually measured in 
terms of the rate of callbacks for job interviews. The 
major advantage of such a design is its high external 
validity. But this advantage can backfire if the CV have 
uncommon combinations of features which may irritate 
the respondents. Researchers are therefore usually con-
strained to varying only one or a few of the applicants’ 
characteristics as the experimental variable(s). In a facto-
rial survey experiment, uncommon trajectories in CV are 
less problematic. Further, the possibility to vary a large 
number of applicant features at once is facilitated because 
each respondent can be asked to evaluate a larger num-
ber of CV. This makes it possible to create a pool of hypo-
thetical candidates with a large number of combinations 
of individual characteristics and to measure their single 
and joint effects on the recruiters’ evaluations. In addi-
tion, it becomes possible to disentangle effects, which 
tend to covary in a real-world setting (e.g. correlation 
between certain occupations and gender), by holding the 
dimensions orthogonal in the experimental design. The 
experimental variables and their interactions can there-
fore be tested in isolation from one another, and their 
effects can be singled out in the analysis. FSE combines 
the advantages of correspondence testing and conven-
tional surveys: it makes it possible to control for the pool 
of applicants on the one hand and to access detailed 
information about the recruiters, the organisational hir-
ing strategies, and recruiting preferences on the other.
4.2  Sampling
To maximise internal and external validity, we choose to 
sample real-world vacancies using online job ads from 
German-speaking Switzerland together with the contact 
information of the recruiters responsible for filling the 
advertised vacancy. The occupational fields of mechan-
ics, finance (banking and insurance), gastronomy (service 
personnel), nursing, and information technology (ICT) 
were chosen for sampling in order to include low-, mid-
dle-, and high-skill jobs, gender-mixed and gender-typed 
jobs, occupations more or less dependent on and linked 
to technological innovations, and to account for jobs with 
higher and lower turnover rates.
To ensure that the fictional applicants adequately fit 
into the profiles of the sampled job vacancies, we devel-
oped sampling criteria for each occupational field in 
order to narrow down the occupation titles based on 
selected four-digit ISCO-08 codes. The selected job-
advertising media were general online job portals, 
which altogether reached a coverage of at least 95% of 
the total number of all general online job portals. In 
addition, vacancies from company websites published 
on local unemployment agencies’ websites were 
included in the sampling. The main sampling was car-
ried out on 8th March 2016 by the Swiss Job Market 
Monitor,3 and all the advertised jobs in German-speak-
ing Switzerland that had been posted in the previous 
14 days in the preselected job portals were collected. A 
second sampling was carried out 2 weeks later in which 
all the job advertisements that had been posted in the 
previous 7  days were collected. The sampling strategy 
allowed us to draw a random sample of job vacancies 
advertised through online job portals for the labour 
market of German-speaking Switzerland. The vacancies 
advertised through this channel account for more than 
half of all vacancies.4
Based on this sampling of job ads, 2118 recruiters were 
contacted, and 739 (35%) of them started the survey.5 In 
comparison to similar recruitment studies relying on a 
factorial survey experiment (e.g. Liechti et al. 2017: 12% 
in Switzerland; Damelang and Abraham 2016: 12.5% in 
Germany), the response rate was relatively high. 
Response rates within each occupational field varied 
between 30% (for catering) and 46% (for nursing) for dis-
continued surveys that provided sufficient information to 
be included in our analysis (Appendix: Table 5). Further 
characteristics of the nonrespondents are not accessible 
because information about the non-responding firms is 
3 Swiss Job Market Monitor (2015) annually surveys comprehensive ran-
dom samples of job ads published in Switzerland and has an internation-
ally unique database on vacancies and job profiles dating back to 1950.
4 Results from yearly firm surveys indicate that in 2014, a markedly rising 
share of over 50% of all vacant jobs were advertised on job portals (Swiss 
Job Market Monitor 2015: 28).
5 Of the 2118 recruiters, 580 (27%) completed the survey.
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not available. Table  1 summarises some company-level 
features of the job sample.
4.3  Experimental variables
To measure the signalling effect of unemployment and 
the moderating effects of education and work experience, 
we set up a  917122 design with the experimental variables6 
being occupation specificity and level of education and 
work experience (nine different combinations), duration 
and timing of unemployment (seven different 
6 The experimental variables are explained in more detail in Shi et al. (2015).
combinations), and gender (two different combinations) 
(Table 2).7 We further varied the number of job changes of 
the hypothetical applicants (two different combina-
tions).8 In this paper, we do not compare the effect of dif-
ferent unemployment timings,9 and we do not focus on 
7 Gender is not an analytical focus of this contribution and will only be used 
as a control variable, but it was implemented as an experimental variable in 
the overall study.
8 Different frequencies of job changes in the applicants’ CV make it possi-
ble to measure the effect of job hopping on recruiters’ evaluations.
9 Preliminary analyses indicate that the reported unemployment effects in 
this study do not depend on the different timings of unemployment.
Table 1 Frequencies of features of the organisations recruiting (data gathered from the recruiter survey)
a  The percentages of single variables may not add up to 100 per cent due to missing cases. We have included the data from discontinued surveys if the relevant item 
was answered
b  We differentiate between respondents who were working as external recruiters in employment agencies (“recruitment agency”) and respondents who were 
working for one of the companies that advertised a position to be filled (“company”)
c  We differentiate between job positions in the public and the private sector
Features of the organisations recruiting Absolute frequencies Relative frequencies in percentage (%)a
Occupational field
Mechanics 129 17.5
Finance 126 17.1
Nursing 205 27.7
Gastronomy (service personnel) 115 15.6
Information technology 164 22.2
Firm size (number of employees)
Less than 50 82 14.0
50 to 249 248 42.3
250 to 999 113 19.3
1000 or more 130 22.2
Type of organisation recruitingb
Recruitment agency 174 25.1
Company (no agency) 501 72.4
Other 17 2.5
Sectorc
Public 120 20.4
Private 438 74.5
Other 26 4.4
Gender of the respondent
Female 313 53.8
Male 269 46.2
Education-level requirement
No specific level of education required 31 4.8
At least an upper secondary/VET degree 354 55.2
At least a tertiary degree 256 39.9
Education-type requirement
Occupation-specific education is indispensable 309 47.9
Occupation-specific education is desirable 225 34.9
Occupation-specific education is not necessary 111 17.2
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the effect of the number of job changes. This results in a 
vignette universe of 252 vignettes, that is, our design has 
252 possible combinations of signals. Based on pretest 
response rates, we decided to field a fraction of 180 
vignettes allocated to 18 decks (10 vignettes per deck) 
and optimised this subset for maximal D-efficiency and 
minimal confounding with respect to the fractionalised 
universe of 180 vignettes and to the assignment of 
vignettes to decks (Auspurg and Hinz 2015). The alloca-
tion of nine vignettes to the vignette decks resulted from 
a randomisation. In every vignette deck, we embedded 
one ideal hypothetical CV with occupation-specific edu-
cation and work experience, at least upper secondary 
education, no unemployment, and no frequent job 
changes. Our analysis shows that, when controlling for 
the ideal vignette, the results stay the same. Nationality 
(Swiss) and a total time of 5  years spent on the labour 
market (employed or unemployed) since leaving formal 
education—the mean age thereby depended on the level 
of education—were held constant in the experiment. An 
example of a fictive CV is shown in the Appendix: Fig. 1.
The variable specificity of education and work expe-
rience reflects whether the applicants had trained and 
worked in one of the five defined occupations or in an 
unrelated occupational field. The variable has three cat-
egories: occupation-specific education and work expe-
rience, non-occupation-specific education and work 
experience, and occupation-specific education and work 
experience in unqualified jobs. To define suitable educa-
tion credentials for vignettes with occupation-specific 
education and work experience in each of the five occu-
pational fields, we used the official Swiss career-coun-
selling webpage (Berufsberatung 2017), which provided 
detailed information about the required education and 
skills for specific occupations in Switzerland. The cat-
egory non-occupation-specific education and work expe-
rience is operationalised by education credentials and 
respective work experience in the retail sector. The cat-
egory occupation-specific education and employment 
experience in unqualified jobs represents job candidates 
who had educational credentials matching the occupa-
tional field of the advertised job position, but they were 
working as call-centre agents. In addition, we distin-
guished three different levels of education: lower second-
ary degree, upper secondary degree, and tertiary degree. 
In all cases, the skill level of work experience in the CV 
was defined so that it corresponded to the level of edu-
cation, which means that a holder of a lower secondary 
Table 2 Experimentally varied characteristics of the hypothetical applicants
Experimental variables Levels of the experimental variables
Level and occupation-specificity of education and work experience Lower secondary education and occupation-specific low-skill job experience (cre-
dentials and job titles according to the occupational field of the advertised job)
Occupation-specific upper secondary education and occupation-specific middle-
skill job experience (credentials and job titles according to the occupational 
field of the advertised job)
Occupation-specific tertiary education and occupation-specific high-skill job 
experience (credentials and job titles according to the occupational field of the 
advertised job)
Lower secondary education and non-occupational low-skill job experience (cre-
dentials and job titles from the retail sector)
Non-occupation-specific upper secondary education and non-occupation-spe-
cific middle-skill job experience (credentials and job titles from the retail sector)
Non-occupation-specific tertiary education and non-occupation-specific high-
skill job experience (credentials and job titles from the retail sector)
Lower secondary education and work experience in unqualified jobs (credentials 
according to the occupational field of the advertised job, and the job title “call-
centre agent”)
Occupation-specific upper secondary education and work experience in unquali-
fied jobs (credentials according to the occupational field of the advertised job, 
and the job title “call-centre agent”)
Occupation-specific tertiary education and work experience in unqualified jobs 
(credentials according to the occupational field of the advertised job, and the 
job title “call-centre agent”)
Duration and timing of unemployment No unemployment
10 months of unemployment after graduation
20 months of unemployment after graduation
10 months of unemployment between jobs
20 months of unemployment between jobs
10 months of current unemployment
20 months of current unemployment
Gender Male
Female
Page 8 of 15Shi et al. J Labour Market Res  (2018) 52:7 
degree was defined to have work experience in a low-skill 
job, a holder of an upper secondary degree in a middle-
skill job, and a holder of a tertiary degree in a high-skill 
job. Work experience as a call-centre agent was an excep-
tion and could follow a lower secondary, upper secondary, 
or tertiary education. For example, a candidate with a BA 
degree (tertiary degree) in advanced mechanics (educa-
tional specificity matching the occupational field) would 
have job experience as a chief mechanic (high-skill level 
job matching the occupational field). In total, this gives us 
nine different combinations of education and work expe-
rience that differ with respect to occupation specificity 
and skill level.
To test the impact of different unemployment dura-
tions, we used 10 months to proxy short unemployment 
and 20  months to proxy long unemployment.10 A maxi-
mum of one period of unemployment could occur on the 
CV. The durations of unemployment were determined by 
considering the different unemployment rates in the four 
countries within the multinational project. While 10 and 
20 months of unemployment could be regarded as rather 
long in Switzerland, such durations are reasonable in Bul-
garia and, especially, in Greece. In the Swiss context, such 
a long period unemployment allows for a fairly conserva-
tive test of our null hypothesis. Or in other words, if no 
unemployment effect can be found despite the pro-
nounced unemployment duration, shorter periods of 
unemployment are even less likely to cause any effects. 
The ex post created variable profile match measures 
whether a hypothetical CV contains the required educa-
tional background and work experience of the advertised 
job. No match applies if a CV does not contain the 
required occupation specificity (horizontal mismatch) or 
if the required level of education is not met (vertical mis-
match). Finally, we control for gender (male = 1).
To further assess our hypotheses H2 and H3, three var-
iables—profile match, match in occupation specificity, 
and match in level—were generated ex post by combin-
ing survey and experimental data.11 The survey data pro-
vided information about the education and job 
experience required by each advertised job in our sample, 
which we matched to our vignette data. For the variable 
profile match, a match is given if the vignette shows both 
the required occupation specificity and level in education 
and job experience. For match in occupation specificity, a 
match occurs if the vignette shows the required 
10 There is no agreement in the literature on the point of time when the 
scarring effect of unemployment becomes significant. Depending on 
country-specific settings, short unemployment is defined as between 6 and 
10  months (Eriksson and Rooth 2014; Kroft et  al. 2013; Oberholzer-Gee 
2008).
11 A match is given (match = 1) if the level and field of education and work 
experience on the fictional CV meet the corresponding job requirements as 
captured by the recruiter survey.
occupation specificity in education and job experience. 
And for match in level, a match is given if the vignette 
shows the required level in education and job experience.
In our design, employers are asked to rate the CV of 
ten hypothetical applicants—the vignettes—which are 
shown in a randomised order, on a scale from 0 to 10 
with regard to the applicants’ chances of being consid-
ered for the specific position they are currently recruit-
ing for. In addition to the vignette dimensions presented 
above, we controlled for the occupational field of the job 
position and the primacy effect with a dummy variable 
indicating the first and second vignette in the series of 
ten consecutively rated CV. Each vignette contained an 
intuitively accessible graphical representation of a short 
fictional CV (see Appendix: Fig. 1).
4.4  Analytical strategy
To examine the effects of unemployment and our other 
experimental variables on the log-transformed rating12 of 
recruiters, we employed random-effects multilevel-linear 
regression models (see Auspurg and Hinz 2015). Every 
recruiter rated multiple vignettes, so we have to account 
for clustering at the level of the recruiters. Our analytical 
strategy accounts for the nested nature of our data 
through recruiter-level random effects and by employing 
cluster and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
With the first two models, we examine H1, which states 
that the chance of being considered for a job is negatively 
associated with the presence and duration of a period 
of unemployment. In Model 1, we regress the vignette 
evaluations on unemployment while controlling for the 
occupational field of the job position, the applicants’ level 
of education and work experience, the occupation speci-
ficity of education and work experience, gender, and the 
vignette order. In Model 2, we differentiate between long 
and short unemployment.
In Model 3, 4, and 5, we add the profile-match variables 
to account for the match between the applicants’ profile 
(education and job experience) and the job requirements 
as well as the interaction of each match variable with 
unemployment. With Model 3, we are testing H2 (the 
chance of being considered for a job is negatively associated 
with the presence of a period of unemployment specifically 
when the applicant’s profile meets the job requirements). 
To test H3 (the chance of being considered for a job is 
negatively associated with the presence of a period of 
unemployment specifically when the applicant shows occu-
pation-specific educational background and work experi-
ence), we compared the moderating effect of horizontal 
and vertical mismatch on unemployment scarring.
12 Given the skewed distribution of the ratings, we took their natural log to 
approach approximately normally distributed residuals.
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5  Results
Due to the log-transformed dependent variable—the 
vignette rating—the coefficients are to be interpreted 
as approximate changes in the percentage points of the 
recruiters’ ratings with a unit change of the independent 
variable. Table 3 shows marginal effects for Model 1 and 
2. The presence of unemployment in a CV reduces the 
rating by approximately 10% points (Model 1, Table  3). 
This corroborates hypothesis H1, which states that unem-
ployment will negatively impact the chance of being con-
sidered for a job. We are controlling for education and 
work experience, the occupational field of the advertised 
positions, the order effect, and the gender of the appli-
cants. The educational background and job experience 
of the applicants have significant impact on the recruit-
ers’ ratings. In comparison to lower secondary education 
and occupation-specific low-skill job experience as the 
reference category, occupation-specific upper secondary 
education and occupation-specific middle-skill job experi-
ence as well as occupation-specific tertiary education and 
occupation-specific high-skill job experience significantly 
improve the ratings. Non-occupation-specific education 
and work experience, on the other hand, decreases the 
ratings regardless of the level of education and job expe-
rience. Applicants with occupation-specific education and 
job experience as call-centre agents are rated lower, but 
the negative effect is not significant for applicants who 
hold a tertiary degree. There are significant differences 
between the occupational fields of the advertised posi-
tion (with catering as the reference category), which are 
not presented in the table. The significant primacy effect 
indicates that recruiters rated the first two CV presented 
to them less favourably than the others. We did not find a 
gender effect.
In Model 2, we allow for differences in ratings due to 
short unemployment and long unemployment (reference 
category: no unemployment). Long and short periods of 
unemployment are associated with respective decreases 
of 12 and 8% points in the ratings. The difference in 
the effect of long and short periods of unemployment is 
both substantive and significant (χ2(1) = 5.66, p < 0.05). 
These findings lend further support to H1. Periods of 
unemployment are globally associated with less favour-
able ratings. More precisely, long periods of unemploy-
ment will evoke a greater penalty than shorter periods of 
unemployment.
To test H2, we added the variable measuring of the 
(horizontal and vertical) match of the applicants’ profiles 
with the job requirements and the interaction term of pro-
file match and unemployment in addition to the variables 
applied in Model 1 (Model 3, Table 4). When the applicants 
possess the required education and job experience (match), 
Table 3 Overall scarring effects of unemployment (standard errors are displayed in parentheses)
The coefficients are log-transformed vignette ratings and can be interpreted as approximate changes in the percentage points of recruiters’ ratings with a unit change 
of the independent variable
+  p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Model 1 Model 2
b (se) b (se)
Unemployment (ref. no unemployment) − 0.100*** (0.02) /
Duration of unemployment (ref. no unemployment)
 Short unemployment / − 0.084*** (0.02)
 Long unemployment / − 0.118*** (0.02)
Type of education—work trajectory (ref.: lower secondary education and occupation-specific low-skill job experience)
 Occupation-specific upper secondary education and occupation-specific middle-skill job experience 0.723*** (0.04) 0.726*** (0.04)
 Occupation-specific tertiary education and occupation-specific high-skill job experience 0.573*** (0.05) 0.575*** (0.05)
 Lower secondary education and non-occupation-specific low-skill job experience − 0.519*** (0.04) − 0.513*** (0.04)
 Non-occupation-specific upper secondary education and non-occupation-specific middle-skill job experience − 0.463*** (0.04) − 0.457*** (0.04)
 Non-occupation-specific tertiary secondary education and non-occupation-specific high-skill job experience − 0.402*** (0.04) − 0.400*** (0.04)
 Lower secondary and call-centre job experience − 0.432*** (0.04) − 0.428*** (0.04)
 Occupation-specific upper secondary education and call-centre job experience − 0.115** (0.04) − 0.112** (0.04)
 Occupation-specific tertiary education and call-centre job experience − 0.038 (0.05) − 0.035 (0.05)
Gender (ref. female) 0.011 (0.01) 0.012 (0.01)
Presentation order of the vignettes (ref. 3rd to 10th vignette) − 0.061*** (0.02) − 0.060*** (0.02)
Constant 1.189*** (0.07) 1.186*** (0.07)
R2 0.340 0.341
Observations 6338 6338
Persons 638 638
Page 10 of 15Shi et al. J Labour Market Res  (2018) 52:7 
the rating increases by 59% points, whereas a period of 
unemployment reduces the rating by 7 percentage points. 
Periods of unemployment lead to an additional decrease of 
6% points in the recruiters’ ratings if the candidate’s profile 
matches the job requirements, but this effect is no longer 
significant. Occupation-specific tertiary education and 
occupation-specific high-skill job experience decreases in its 
magnitude and lost its significance. Gender remains insig-
nificant, and the order effect remains unchanged.
To differentiate between the moderating effect of 
a (mis-)match in the occupation specificity of educa-
tion and job experience from the moderating effect of 
a (mis-)match in the level of education and job experi-
ence, we separate the horizontal and vertical(mis-)match 
effects in Model 4. Both a match in occupation specific-
ity and a match in level significantly increase the rating 
by 51 and 40% points, respectively. The unemployment 
effect is neither significant nor substantive when there 
is no match between the applicants’ profiles and the job 
requirements. Also, the interaction term of level match 
and unemployment does not become significant, indi-
cating that the size of the unemployment effect does not 
depend on the required level in education and job expe-
rience. By contrast, the significant interaction term of 
occupation-specificity match and unemployment suggests 
a substantive scarring effect of unemployment of approxi-
mately—10% points, which is limited to applicants with 
the required occupation specificity in education and job 
experience.
Looking at the control variables after differentiating 
how well applicants’ profiles match the job requirements, 
the previous effects of some control variables, such as 
call-centre job experience, notably decreased. The gender 
and order effect are again largely unchanged.
6  Discussion
We have attempted to contribute to the debate on mis-
match and unemployment by analysing how a (mis-)match 
between an applicant’s profile and the job requirements 
moderates unemployment scarring and by differentiating 
Table 4 Scarring effects of unemployment with profile match as moderator (standard errors are displayed in parenthe-
ses)
The coefficients are log-transformed vignette ratings and can be interpreted as approximate changes in the percentage points of recruiters’ ratings with a unit change 
of the independent variable
+  p < 0.10, * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001
Model 3 Model 4
b (se) b (se)
Unemployment (ref. no unemployment) − 0.073*** (0.02) − 0.010 (0.03)
Match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (ref. no match)
 Match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (occupation specificity and level) 0.593*** (0.06) /
 Match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (only in occupation specificity) / 0.508*** (0.10)
 Match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (only in level) / 0.403*** (0.05)
Unemployment and match (ref. no unemployment and no match)
 Unemployment with match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (occupation specificity and level) − 0.064+ (0.04) /
 Unemployment with match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (only in occupation specificity) / − 0.100** (0.04)
 Unemployment with match in applicant’s profile and job requirements (only in level) / − 0.060+ (0.03)
Type of education—work trajectory (ref.: lower secondary education and occupation-specific low-skill job experience)
 Occupation-specific upper secondary education and occupation-specific middle-skill job experience 0.430*** (0.06) 0.514*** (0.05)
 Occupation-specific tertiary education and occupation-specific high-skill job experience 0.058 (0.07) 0.215*** (0.06)
 Lower secondary education and non-occupation-specific low-skill job experience − 0.526*** (0.04) − 0.113 (0.10)
 Non-occupation-specific upper secondary education and non-occupation-specific middle-skill job experience − 0.455*** (0.04) − 0.247* (0.10)
 Non-occupation-specific tertiary secondary education and non-occupation-specific high-skill job experience − 0.406*** (0.04) − 0.326** (0.11)
 Lower secondary education and call-centre job experience − 0.428*** (0.04) − 0.04 (0.10)
 Occupation-specific upper secondary education and call-centre job experience − 0.127** (0.04) 0.083 (0.10)
 Occupation-specific tertiary education and call-centre job experience − 0.073 (0.05) 0.006 (0.11)
Gender (ref. female) 0.007 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01)
Presentation order of the vignettes (ref. 3rd to 10th vignette) − 0.056** (0.02) − 0.056** (0.02)
Constant 1.176*** (0.07) 0.716*** (0.12)
R2 0.356 0.351
Observations 6298 6298
Persons 634 634
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between mismatch in occupation specificity and mismatch 
in educational level. The presented results largely sup-
port our hypotheses, which allows us to make two con-
tributions. First, we have found that the recruiter rating 
of job applicants’ CV decreases with increasing lengths of 
unemployment. This finding supports the first hypothesis, 
which states that longer periods of unemployment have 
stronger negative signalling effects than shorter periods. 
A possible explanation could be that employers suspect 
human-capital depreciation to advance with increasing 
durations of labour-market inactivity. Another explanation 
could be that employers interpret long-term unemploy-
ment as a strong negative signal indicating problematic 
traits of the applicant, some of which may not be observa-
ble during recruitment. This is especially likely in the Swiss 
context where the youth unemployment rate is low and 
long-term unemployment is rare. Our results are in line 
with previous similarly designed studies that also found 
evidence for negative duration dependence (Eriksson and 
Rooth 2014; Kroft et al. 2013; Oberholzer-Gee 2008). But 
while we have found that 20-month periods of unemploy-
ment are rated significantly worse than 10-month periods, 
Kroft et  al. (2013) suggested that the negative effects of 
unemployment on callback rates only increase during the 
early phase of unemployment and stabilise after the first 
8 months. And Oberholzer-Gee (2008) demonstrated that 
unemployment had no effect on the callback rate for fictive 
applicants with 18 months of unemployment, and that the 
unemployment effect only kicks in when unemployment 
lasts longer than two-and-a-half years. Eriksson and Rooth 
(2014), on the other hand, found the negative unemploy-
ment effect to occur after 9 months but only in low- and 
middle-skill jobs and not in high-skill jobs. In contrast, our 
findings differ from studies that have not found evidence 
for negative duration dependence (Nunley et al. 2017, Far-
ber et al. 2015). Possible reasons for the minor and major 
discrepancies are most likely due to the different experi-
mental settings, sample characteristics, and labour-market 
conditions. Regarding the operationalisation of unem-
ployment, different durations were employed in the lit-
erature. While Eriksson and Rooth (2014) used 9 months 
to proxy long periods of unemployment, Oberholzer-Gee 
(2008) used up to 30 months, and we tested with 10 and 
20  months. Furthermore, while Kroft et  al. (2013) sam-
pled for low- and middle-skill jobs in major US cities and 
excluded jobs requiring advanced degrees, Oberholzer-
Gee (2008) restricted his sample to administrative-assis-
tant positions in Switzerland. Nunley et al. (2017) sampled 
graduate jobs requiring college degrees in seven US cit-
ies. Similarly, Farber et  al. (2015) limited their sample to 
white-collar office jobs in eight US cities. In our study, 
we collected vacancies in five occupational fields cover-
ing low-, middle-, and high-skill jobs in German-speaking 
Switzerland. Lastly, the fictive CV in these studies differ 
with regard to gender, age, education, and ethnicity.
As a second contribution, we have found that a detailed 
operationalisation of educational background and work 
experience helps to explain the heterogeneity in recruit-
ers’ assessments of young job applicants. Applicants with 
occupation-specific education and work experience are 
evaluated significantly better than applicants who do not 
have occupation-specific education and have worked in 
an unrelated occupation. Also, compared to candidates 
with upper secondary or tertiary degrees, unqualified 
applicants with a compulsory education have much lower 
chances of being considered for the advertised position.13 
Interestingly, job experience as a call-centre agent 
decreases the recruiters’ ratings of applicants with lower 
secondary or upper secondary degrees, but for the ter-
tiary degree holders, work experience in an unqualified 
job does not lead to a decrease in the recruiters’ evalua-
tions. This may indicate that employers believe that ter-
tiary degree holders have already demonstrated their 
potential abilities and productivity by graduating from 
higher education. Working as a call-centre agent could 
therefore be considered a (temporary) voluntary choice.
We further analysed the interaction effect of unemploy-
ment and match between the applicants’ profiles and the 
job requirements. We argued that in the Swiss context, 
where the trust of recruiters in credentials is strong, the 
negative effect of unemployment only unfolds in  situa-
tions where the match between the applicant’s profile and 
the job requirements is given and that unemployment 
does not matter if applicants do not have a matching 
profile. In line with hypothesis (H2), we found stronger 
unemployment scarring for applicants with matching 
profiles than for applicants who do not meet the basic job 
requirements. But this difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (significance at a level of p < 0.10).
This non-significant result required further investiga-
tion. We proposed differentiating between horizontal 
and vertical (mis-)match between the applicants’ pro-
files and the job requirements in order to disentangle the 
(mis-)match in level from the (mis-)match in occupation 
specificity. It then became apparent that in the Swiss con-
text, unemployment only scars if the applicant has occu-
pation-specific education and job experience. In all other 
cases, unemployment does not decrease the perceived 
chances of being considered for the advertised posi-
tion. This result corroborates our third hypothesis (H3). 
The previously insignificant effect of unemployment for 
applicants with an adequate educational background 
13 It should be noted that we only sampled for jobs requiring formal creden-
tials or certificates. The penalisation of those with less education is therefore 
not a surprise.
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and job experience might partly be explained by insuf-
ficient differentiation between horizontal and vertical 
profile (mis-)match. Within the strongly occupationally 
segmented Swiss labour market, occupation-specific 
training and work experience seems to be crucial for job 
applicants. If applicants do not meet these conditions, 
unemployment does not further decrease their chances 
of being considered for the job. If, however, applicants 
have passed the first threshold, unemployment does 
become a factor that has a negative impact on recruiters’ 
judgment. These findings seem plausible for a country in 
which on-the-job training is not the predominant form 
of skill acquisition. Employers rather expect applicants 
to possess the knowledge and skills relevant for the spe-
cific occupation. If applicants were trained in an unre-
lated occupation, unemployment is not associated with 
human-capital depreciation since they are not endowed 
with the required specific human capital in the first place. 
To validate whether our findings are specific to the con-
text of a strongly VET-focused education system and 
occupationally segmented labour market, further studies 
in other countries with comparable economic conditions 
but different education systems and labour-market struc-
tures would be necessary.
7  Conclusion
We found that the presence of unemployment decreases 
the perceived suitability of applicants for vacancies and 
that the scarring effect of unemployment increases with 
its duration. Moreover, our paper contributes to the lit-
erature by demonstrating that whether unemployment 
scarring occurs depends on how well the applicant’s 
profile meets the job requirements. In a country with a 
strongly standardised VET system, the scarring effect of 
unemployment only unfolds if the applicant has received 
the required occupation-specific training and has worked 
in the appropriate occupational field. If candidates do 
not have the required occupation-specific education and 
job experience, they have much lower chances of being 
considered for the position, and unemployment does not 
additionally scar their chances. Overall, our findings sug-
gest that recruiters’ expectations of human-capital depre-
ciation during unemployment is a driving mechanism 
in causing unemployment scarring in the Swiss con-
text: obviously, recruiters can only associate unemploy-
ment with skill depreciation if applicants have actually 
acquired the relevant skills in the first place. In this sense, 
our results indicate that recruiters suspect an undesirable 
loss of occupation-specific human capital if applicants 
have been unemployed for some time. By contrast, we 
have no evidence that unemployment serves as a general 
signal of undesirable applicant characteristics since appli-
cants without the requested occupation-specific skills 
are hardly affected by unemployment scarring at all. We 
do find support for signalling theory, however, when it 
comes to how employers use education degrees and pre-
vious work experience as hiring criteria: the strong posi-
tive effect of matching education degree and job title can 
be interpreted as due to the employers’ strong trust in 
credentials. This is plausible in an education system that 
is predominated by the VET system.
A limitation of our study is that we asked the recruiters 
to evaluate fictive applicants’ chances of being considered 
for advertised jobs, and their evaluations may therefore 
deviate from their actual hiring behaviour. Furthermore, 
our findings are confined to the German-speaking region 
of the Swiss labour market, which shows a relatively low 
youth unemployment rate compared to other European 
countries that have been severely hit by the recent Great 
Recession. For labour-market contexts with increas-
ing employability requirements, unemployment seems 
to possess a signalling power in the eyes of employers. 
Further research is needed to understand how the occu-
pational match of job applicants and jobs impacts unem-
ployment scarring in countries where general education 
predominates instead of VET and the linkage of educa-
tion and employment is weaker.
Authors’ contributions
LPS, CI, SS and RS jointly designed and implemented the factorial survey. 
All authors engaged in the development of the theoretical argument and 
empirical analysis. LPS carried out the statistical calculations and wrote up 
the article under the supervision of CI, SS and RS. CI, SS and RS contributed to 
manuscript drafting. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Author details
1 Social Research and Methodology Group, University of Basel, Petersgraben 
27, 4051 Basel, Switzerland. 2 Department of Sociology and Political Sci-
ence, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Dragvoll, bygg 10, 
7491 Trondheim, Norway. 3 Université du Luxembourg, Maison des Sciences 
Humaines, 11, Porte des Sciences, 4366 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg. 4 Insti-
tute of Sociology, University of Bern, Fabrikstrasse 8, 3012 Bern, Switzerland. 
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this manuscript. This study was funded by the 
Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI (Grant 
Number 15.0089, 649395) as part of the Horizon 2020 project ‘Negotiat-
ing early job-insecurity and labour market exclusion in Europe—NEGOTI-
ATE’ (Horizon 2020, Societal Challenge 6, H2020—YOUNG-SOCIETY-2014, 
YOUNG-1-2014).
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Ethics approval and consent to participate was implemented according to the 
Data Management Plan (Deliverable 1.2) of the NEGOTIATE project, which has 
been approved by the European Commission. Participation in the vignette 
experiments was based on the principle of free, explicit and informed consent. 
The researchers have ensured participants’ right to withdraw from the survey 
at any time during data collection and data preparation. In general, the pro-
ject has strictly adhered to the ‘Data Protection Directive’ (Directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data).
Page 13 of 15Shi et al. J Labour Market Res  (2018) 52:7 
Appendix
See Table 5, Fig. 1.
Table 5 Response rates in the occupational fields
Occupational field Absolute response 
rate (N)
Response rate (%)
Mechanics 129 30.6
Finance 126 31.6
Nursing 205 45.9
Catering 115 29.6
ICT 164 35.6
Fig. 1 Illustration of a fictive CV
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